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INTRODUCTION 
The patent exhaustion doctrine1 generally holds that the autho-
rized first sale2 of a patented good terminates the patent holder’s 
right to restrict the buyer’s subsequent use and sale of that good.3 
Patent exhaustion is an affirmative defense to a claim for patent 
infringement.4 It is grounded under U.S. patent law in the public 
policy rationale referred to in this Article as the single reward prin-
ciple. The premise of the single reward principle is simple and fair. 
A patent holder is entitled only to a single reward for the sale of a 
patented good, because a patent holder receives the reward in-
tended as the utilitarian incentive to invent when selling the pa-
tented good.5 
But despite this simple policy rationale and its more than 150-
year history, U.S. courts so far have not articulated a complete 
framework for applying the patent exhaustion doctrine to foreign 
sales. The application of the doctrine to foreign sales is compli-
cated, because patent law is territorial, existing generally under the 
national laws of each country. Since 2001, the Federal Circuit has 
ruled several times on patent exhaustion from foreign sales.6 The 
decisions are consistent with the territorial boundaries of patent 
law and hold that the patent exhaustion doctrine is territorially li-
                                                                                                                            
1 This Article uses the term “patent exhaustion” instead of “first sale” because, as 
this Article demonstrates, a first sale can occur in a foreign jurisdiction without 
termination of the statutory right to exclude held by the U.S. patent owner as to the good 
sold. 
2 “Authorized” first sale as used in this Article means the transfer of all right and title 
to a patented good by a patentee, or a person or entity authorized by the patentee. 
3 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625 (2008); United 
States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250 (1942); see also 5 DONALD S. CHISUM, 
CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[2][a] (Matthew Bender ed., 2014); 6 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S 
WALKER ON PATENTS § 19:1 (4th ed. 2012). 
4 5 CHISUM, supra note 3, § 16.03[2][a]. 
5 Univis, 316 U.S. at 251 (“Our decisions have uniformly recognized that the purpose 
of the patent law [to promote progress in the useful arts] is fulfilled with respect to any 
particular article when the patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by 
the sale of the article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis 
for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.”). 
6 See, e.g., Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 667 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Fuji Photo Film Co. 
v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade 
Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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mited.7 The Federal Circuit’s decisions, however, rely on a limited 
rationale and as a result lack certainty when applied to new fact 
patterns. Most importantly, the Federal Circuit decisions do not 
address the effect of patent exhaustion in a foreign sale when the 
sale contractually authorizes the buyer to engage in conduct with 
respect to the invention within U.S. territory.8 
This Article employs the legal principles underlying the Feder-
al Circuit decisions to propose a simple but complete framework 
that the courts may use to apply patent exhaustion to foreign sales 
in future decisions. The proposed framework holds that the patent 
exhaustion doctrine does not apply to a foreign sale unless the U.S. 
patent holder has also contractually authorized importation into, 
use, or sale of the patented good in the U.S. Contractual authoriza-
tion under the proposed framework means that the patent holder 
receives some form of consideration in exchange for the termina-
tion of the statutory right to exclude9 under a U.S. patent. The 
proposed framework thereby leaves the exhaustion doctrine free of 
fact-dependent inquiries regarding parallel foreign patent rights. 
The proposed framework is based on two foundational prin-
ciples of U.S. patent law: the nature of the patent grant solely as a 
right to exclude10 and the territorial scope of the patent grant as 
limited to U.S. territory.11 By closely adhering to these foundational 
principles, the framework produces predictable and consistent out-
comes across a full spectrum of possible fact patterns involving the 
                                                                                                                            
7 See Fuji Photo Film Co., 394 F.3d at 1376 (“The patentee’s authorization of an 
international first sale does not affect exhaustion of that patentee’s rights in the United 
States.”); Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1105 (“United States patent rights are not 
exhausted by products of foreign provenance. To invoke the protection of the first sale 
doctrine, the authorized first sale must have occurred under the United States patent.”). 
The territoriality doctrine thus holds, in general, that transactions occurring outside U.S. 
jurisdictional territory are not subject to U.S. patent law. See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T 
Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007); Dowagiac Mfg. Co. v. Minnesota Moline Plow Co., 
235 U.S. 641, 650–51 (1915) (holding that U.S. patent law does not apply to a foreign sale 
where “no part of the transaction occur[ed] within the United States”); 3 MOY, supra 
note 3, § 12:11 (“[A]ctivities outside the United States are outside the scope of the 
patent.”). 
8 For example, where a U.S. patentee sells a good covered by a U.S. patent in 
Denmark but also contractually authorizes importation into and resale in the U.S. 
9 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). 
10 See infra Part I.A. 
11 See infra Part I.B. 
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foreign sale of goods also patented in the U.S. As a result, the 
framework’s territorial limitation of the patent exhaustion doctrine 
ensures that the doctrine can be applied uniformly to all foreign 
sales with foreseeable results, thereby providing certainty to U.S. 
patent holders, licensees, and their foreign purchasers when struc-
turing foreign sales potentially involving U.S. patent rights. 
Part I of this Article reasserts the basic nature of the U.S. pa-
tent grant solely as a statutory right to exclude.12 It next reviews the 
territorial scope of the U.S. patent grant, finding that Congress 
must show clear intent for a provision of U.S. patent law to apply 
to conduct outside U.S. territory, and that international agree-
ments have reinforced the limited territorial scope of U.S. patent 
law.13 Part II lays out the foundation for the proposed framework by 
first analyzing the theoretical underpinnings of the single reward 
principle.14 It then applies the limited territorial scope of the U.S. 
patent grant to the single reward principle to demonstrate why pa-
tent exhaustion must be limited territorially.15 Lastly, to present a 
complete framework, Part II examines the boundaries of the terri-
torial limitation of patent exhaustion, concluding that patent ex-
haustion must also result from a foreign sale contractually authoriz-
ing conduct with regard to the invention within U.S. territory.16 
Part III applies the proposed framework for patent exhaustion from 
foreign sales to common fact patterns to illustrate how the frame-
work provides certainty to U.S. patent holders, licensees, and their 
foreign purchasers.17 
I. THE NATURE AND TERRITORIAL SCOPE OF THE U.S. 
PATENT GRANT 
The proposed framework rests on two foundational principles 
of U.S. patent law: the nature of the patent grant as a right to ex-
clude and the territorial scope of the patent grant as defined by 
Congress and the Supreme Court. These principles operate as the 
                                                                                                                            
12 See infra Part I.A. 
13 See infra Part I.B. 
14 See infra Part II.A. 
15 See infra Part II.B. 
16 See infra Part II.C. 
17 See infra Part III. 
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boundaries for the patent exhaustion doctrine when applied to for-
eign sales. 
A. The Statutory Right to Exclude 
1. A Right to Exclude 
Utilitarian theory generally justifies U.S. patent law as a means 
to maximize the greatest good to society from intellectual endea-
vors.18 Patent law may therefore best be understood as a legal 
means to an economic end.19 Patent law incentivizes innovative be-
havior to create economic growth and to expand the knowledge 
base spurring future innovative activity.20 The patent grant 
                                                                                                                            
18 See F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 48–49 (6th ed. 2013) 
(“[T]he predominant justification for American intellectual property law has been, 
without question, utilitarianism . . . .”); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent 
Practices and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 24 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 159, 175–81 
(1942) (discussing the economic incentive of patent law in three subparts: (1) the 
incentive to invent, (2) the incentive to disclose, and (3) the incentive to risk resources in 
commercializing the invention). Others have argued that natural rights or labor theory 
influences U.S. patent law as well. E.g., Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson 
Thought About Patents? Reevaluating the Patent “Privilege” in Historical Context, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 953, 969–98 (2007). Further, some economists have disputed the actual 
economic effects of the patent system. See Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, The Case 
Against Patents (Fed. Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No. 2012-035A, 2012), 
available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2012/2012-035.pdf. But see Ashish Arora 
et al., R&D and the Patent Premium 34–35 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 9431, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9431 (concluding that 
patent protection stimulates R&D spending); ECON. & STATISTICS ADMIN. & U.S. 
PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: 
INDUSTRIES IN FOCUS 43 (Mar. 2012), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf (showing that 
patent-intensive industries accounted directly for about 3.9 million jobs and indirectly 
supported about another 3.2 million jobs in 2010); EUROPEAN PATENT OFF. & OFF. FOR 
HARMONIZATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 
INTENSIVE INDUSTRIES: CONTRIBUTION TO ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND EMPLOYMENT 
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 59 (Sept. 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/intellectual-property/docs/joint-report-epo-ohim-
final-version_en.pdf (finding patent-intensive industries account for 10% of total 
employment in the European Union). 
19 See United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942) (“[T]he promotion of 
the progress of science and the useful arts is the ‘main object’; reward of inventors is 
secondary and merely a means to that end.”). 
20 See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 18, at 48–68; EDMUND PHELPS, MASS FLOURISHING: 
HOW GRASSROOTS INNOVATION CREATED JOBS, CHALLENGE, AND CHANGE 29 (2013) 
(discussing pecuniary motives for innovation). 
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achieves its utilitarian objective by granting a patentee the statutory 
“right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or 
selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the 
invention into the United States.”21 The statutory right to exclude 
is necessary because inventions are public goods—consumption or 
possession of the invention by one person does not preclude con-
sumption or possession of the invention by another.22 Without the 
right to exclude, an inventor would have little incentive to invest 
time and effort if a second-comer could appropriate an invention 
and sell it before the inventor could recover the costs of developing 
the invention and creating a market for it.23 
2. The Patent Does Not Grant a Positive Right to Make, 
Use, and Sell 
The right to exclude is the only right conferred by the patent.24 
The Supreme Court has unequivocally held that the U.S. patent 
                                                                                                                            
21 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012). See also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 
250 (1942) (“The declared purpose of the patent law is to promote the progress of 
science and the useful arts by granting to the inventor a limited monopoly, the exercise of 
which will enable him to secure the financial rewards for his invention.”); Rich, supra 
note 18, at 164 (discussing the economic power effectuated by the statutory right to 
exclude). 
22 See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 18, at 60. Thomas Jefferson described the public goods 
problem in a letter to Isaac McPherson in 1813: 
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself 
without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives 
light without darkening me. That ideas should freely spread from one 
to another over the globe, for the moral and mutual instruction of 
man, and improvement of his condition, seems to have been 
peculiarly and benevolently designed by nature, when she made them, 
like fire, expansible over all space, without lessening their density in 
any point, and like the air in which we breathe, move, and have our 
physical being, incapable of confinement or exclusive appropriation. 
Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property. Society 
may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an 
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but 
this may or may not be done, according to the will and convenience of 
the society, without claim or complaint from anybody. 
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 326, 334–335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb ed., 1903). 
23 See KIEFF ET AL., supra note 18, at 60–61. 
24 See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852) (“The franchise which the 
patent grants, consists altogether in the right to exclude every one from making, using, or 
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grant is not a positive right to make, use, and sell the patented in-
vention.25 Patentees have the right to make, use, and sell an inven-
                                                                                                                            
vending the thing patented, without the permission of the patentee. This is all that he 
obtains by the patent.”). 
25 See United Shoe Mach. Corp. v. United States, 258 U.S. 451, 463 (1922) (“From an 
early day it has been held by this court that the franchise secured by a patent consists only 
in the right to exclude others from making, using, or vending the thing patented without 
the permission of the patentee.”); Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 10 (1913) (“The 
right to make, use, and sell an invented article is not derived from the patent law. This 
right existed before and without the passage of the law, and was always the right of an 
inventor. The act secured to the inventor the exclusive right to make, use, and vend the 
thing patented, and consequently to prevent others from exercising like privileges without 
the consent of the patentee.”); United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 238–39 
(1897); McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549; In re Brosnahan, 18 F. 62, 64 (C.C.W.D. Mo. 1883). 
Despite the Supreme Court’s express admonition, there has been confusion as to the 
nature of the patent grant. That confusion likely arose from the poorly worded definition 
of the patent grant in the Patent Act of 1870, granting “the exclusive right to make, use 
and vend the said invention or discovery.” Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 
201 (1870); see also FRANK Y. GLADNEY, RESTRAINTS OF TRADE IN PATENTED ARTICLES 9 
(1910); GILES S. RICH, JUDGES’ PRIMER: PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW AND PROCEDURE 
(1970), reprinted in 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. SOC’Y 83, 88 (2009) (“A patent grants no right to 
do any other thing and is no protection against Infringement. That is the established 
meaning of the words ‘exclusive right’ in the Constitution—only a right to exclude. 
Throughout history, there has been much confusion on this point principally because of 
use of the phrase ‘exclusive right to make, use, and vend the invention’ in pre-1958 law 
(old 85 U.S.C. § 40, R.S. 4884).”). It appears that Judge Rich, as a drafter of the Patent 
Act of 1952, took great joy in the new patent act correctly defining the patent grant in 
section 154 as a right to exclude. See Giles S. Rich, Address to the New York Patent Law 
Association on the Patent Act of 1952 (Nov. 6, 1952), reprinted in 3 J. FED. CIR. HIST. 
SOC’Y 104, 111 (2009) (“Section 154 at long last brings about a realistic and accurate 
statement of the patent right, ‘the right to exclude others.’ In the course of the next 
generation or two it may help to dispel some of the fog surrounding patents.”); see also 
King Instruments Corp. v. Perego, 65 F.3d 941, 949 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Rader, J.) (“The 
1952 amendment should have corrected any mistaken belief that patent rights somehow 
hinged upon the patentee’s exploitation of the invention. Inventors possess the natural 
right to exploit their inventions (subject to the patent rights of others in a dominant 
patent) apart from any Government grant.”). Judge Rich’s satisfaction reflects prior 
writings, in which he had lamented the general misunderstanding between the statutory 
right to exclude conferred by the patent grant and a patent owner’s common-law right to 
make, use, and sell an invention. Rich, supra note 18, at 168 (“This first principle of 
patent law would not be here reviewed but for a sincere desire to add the author’s mite 
towards ending the confusion between what is given by the patent law, and is therefore 
within its scope, and what is not received from the patent law, and is therefore subject 
solely to the general law.”). But see generally Mossoff, supra note 18 (arguing that the 
prevailing understanding of the patent grant solely as a right to exclude fails to include the 
significant historical influence of natural rights property theory). 
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tion without the grant of a patent.26 Patentees do not need permis-
sion or power under U.S. patent law to conceive an invention, re-
duce it to practice, or create a tangible embodiment of the inven-
tion. Likewise, patentees need no positive statutory right to sell the 
embodiment of the invention to another. Accordingly, the pro-
posed framework treats the patent grant solely as a statutory right 
to exclude others—not as a right to make, use, or sell the inven-
tion.27 
                                                                                                                            
26 See Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Mach. Works, 261 U.S. 24, 34–36 (1923); 
Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 510 (1917) (“It has 
long been settled that the patentee receives nothing from the law which he did not have 
before, and that the only effect of his patent is to restrain others from manufacturing, 
using, or selling that which he has invented. The patent law simply protects him in the 
monopoly of that which he has invented and has described in the claims of his patent.”); 
Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 507 (1878) (“The sole operation of the [patent] 
statute is to enable him to prevent others from using the products of his labors except 
with his consent.”); McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549; see also GLADNEY, supra note 25, at 13 
(“‘A patentee has two kinds of rights in his invention. He has a right to make, use and sell 
specimens of the invented thing; and he has a right to prevent all other persons from 
doing either of these acts. The first of these rights is wholly independent of the patent 
laws; while the second exists by virtue of those laws alone.’” (quoting ALBERT H. 
WALKER, TEXT-BOOK OF THE PATENT LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA § 155 
(4th ed. 1904))); Rich, supra note 18, at 166–67. 
27 The rights exercised in the sale of a patented good in itself are therefore no different 
than the rights exercised in the sale of a nonpatented good—they are generally protected 
by common law and thus subject to state contract law. E.g., McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549–
50; see GLADNEY, supra note 25, at 38. Accordingly, the only rights actually transferred in 
a sale of any good, whether patented or not, are the rights to use, sell, and repair the good 
as long as the good exists. Bloomer, 55 U.S. at 549 (“In using [the patented good], [the 
purchaser] exercises no rights created by the act of Congress, nor does [the purchaser] 
derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or exclusive privilege granted to the 
patentee.”); GLADNEY, supra note 25, at 81. As such, the economic power residing in the 
statutory right to exclude is not valuable in itself. Only where the statutory right to 
exclude protects an invention that is valuable to society will the patentee reap the benefits 
of controlling price and output to maximize the invention’s commercial value. That is, 
the true economic value of the statutory right to exclude is that it makes valuable the 
patentee’s common law right to make, use, and sell the invention. Id. at 79; see also Rich, 
supra note 18, at 171. 
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B. The Territorial Scope of U.S. Patent Law 
1. Supreme Court and Statutory Limitations on the 
Territorial Scope 
a) Traditional Territorial Scope 
Congress has the power under the Exclusive Rights Clause to 
enact patent laws that apply to conduct outside U.S. territory.28 
But the Supreme Court has consistently applied a presumption 
against extraterritoriality to hold that U.S. law does not apply to 
conduct occurring outside U.S. territory absent clear Congression-
al intent to the contrary.29 Accordingly, the Supreme Court con-
strues U.S. patent law to generally apply only to conduct within 
U.S. territory:30 
The presumption that United States law governs 
domestically but does not rule the world applies with 
particular force in patent law. The traditional under-
standing that our patent law operates only domesti-
cally and does not extend to foreign activities is em-
bedded in the Patent Act itself, which provides that 
a patent confers exclusive rights in an invention 
within the United States.31 
                                                                                                                            
28 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) (“The direction 
of Art. I is that Congress shall have the power to promote the progress of science and the 
useful arts. When, as here, the Constitution is permissive, the sign of how far Congress 
has chosen to go can come only from Congress.”), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) 
(2004), as recognized in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 
2118 n.4 (2014). 
29 See Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010); Foley Bros. v. 
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) (citing Blackmer v. U.S., 284 U.S. 421, 437 (1932)). 
This canon of statutory construction requires the courts to “assume that Congress 
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality” and that 
“unless there is ‘the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed,’ we must 
presume it ‘is primarily concerned with domestic conditions.’” E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., 353 
U.S. 138, 147 (1957)); Foley, 336 U.S. at 285). 
30 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 444 (2007) (requiring clear 
congressional intent to apply U.S. patent law beyond the traditional territorial jurisdiction 
of the U.S.). 
31 Id. at 454–55 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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The strict territorial limitation of U.S. patent law originates in 
the Supreme Court’s 1856 decision in Brown v. Duchesne, in which 
a French vessel, temporarily in a U.S. port, was accused of in-
fringement resulting from the use of a gaff saddle, also patented in 
the U.S.32 The Supreme Court held that the power granted to 
Congress under the Exclusive Rights Clause is “domestic in its 
character” and that the laws enacted under it are therefore pre-
sumed to be limited to U.S. territory: 
[Nothing] in the patent laws . . . should lead to a dif-
ferent conclusion. [The laws] are all manifestly in-
tended to carry into execution this particular power. 
They secure to the inventor a just remuneration 
from those who derive a profit or advantage, within 
the United States, from his genius and mental labors. 
. . . 
[T]hese acts of Congress do not, and were not in-
tended to, operate beyond the limits of the United 
States; and as the patentee’s right of property and 
exclusive use is derived from them, they cannot ex-
tend beyond the limits to which the law itself is con-
fined.33 
The territorial limitation of U.S. patent law was subsequently 
codified in section 22 of the Patent Act of 1870.34 The Patent Act 
of 1952 expanded the express statutory territorial limitation of U.S. 
patent law, by directly inserting the limitation in the patent grant 
under section 154, and the right to claim infringement under sec-
                                                                                                                            
32 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 193–94 (1856). 
33 Id. at 195 (emphasis added). 
34 See Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 22, 16 Stat. 198, 201 (1870) (“[E]very patent shall 
contain a short title or description of the invention or discovery, correctly indicating its 
nature and design, and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of 
seventeen years, of the exclusive right to make, use and vend the said invention or 
discovery throughout the United States and the Territories thereof, referring to the 
specification for the particulars thereof . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2130 
(2008) (“The statute . . . explicitly contains a territorial restriction . . . .”); 3 MOY, supra 
note 3, § 12:5 (inferring that the territorial limitation was codified in response to the 
Supreme Court’s holding in Brown). 
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tion 271.35 As a result, the rights conferred to a patentee under a 
U.S. patent are limited geographically to U.S. territory. Section 154 
reads in relevant part: 
Every patent shall contain a short title of the inven-
tion and a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, 
of the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States, and, if the invention is a process, of 
the right to exclude others from using, offering for 
sale or selling throughout the United States, or im-
porting into the United States, products made by that 
process, referring to the specification for the parti-
culars thereof.36  
The right to claim infringement of the patent correspondingly 
limits its reach to the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells 
any patented invention, within the United States or 
imports into the United States any patented invention 
during the term of the patent therefor, infringes the 
patent.37 
Further, section 100(c) of the Patent Act of 1952 for the first 
time defined the “United States” when used in the statute as “the 
United States of America, its territories and possessions.”38 
                                                                                                                            
35 See, e.g., Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) 
(codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2012)); 3 MOY, supra note 3, § 12:6. 
36 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (emphasis added). 
37 Id. § 271(a) (2012) (emphasis added). As discussed in Part II.B.1.b infra, section 271 
has been expanded by Congress to respond to strict judicial interpretation of section 271 
resolving any doubt regarding the geographic reach of section 271 against the presumption 
of extraterritoriality. 
38 Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-593, ch. 950, 82nd Cong., 66 Stat. 792 (codified 
as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2012)). The new definition of U.S. territory in section 
100(c) was characterized as “more definitely stated” by one of the drafters of the 1952 
Patent Act. P.J. Federico, Commentary on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq., at 
15–16 (1954 ed. West) reprinted in 75 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 161, 201 (1993). 
See also 3 MOY, supra note 3, § 12:6. 
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b) Congressional Action Required to Expand the 
Territorial Scope 
As a result of the Supreme Court’s strict territorial interpreta-
tion of U.S. patent law, the Court requires Congress to act if Con-
gress wishes to expand the territorial scope of a provision or doc-
trine. For example, the Supreme Court held in Deepsouth Packaging 
Co. v. Laitram Corp. that the right to manufacture a patented com-
bination invention was not infringed under section 271(a) where all 
substantial parts were made within the U.S. but assembled outside 
U.S. territory, because the infringing invention—all parts fully as-
sembled—existed only outside U.S. territory.39 The Supreme 
Court reached its holding by emphasizing that the U.S. “patent 
system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect,” because U.S. pa-
tent law was not intended to operate outside U.S. territory.40 Con-
gress, unhappy with the result, responded to Deepsouth by expand-
ing the territorial scope of section 271 through the 1984 enactment 
of section 271(f).41 Section 271(f) provides holders of combination 
patents a cause of action for infringement, where “all or a substan-
tial portion of the components of a patented invention” are sup-
plied from the U.S.42 Similarly, Congress enacted section 271(g) in 
1988, making it an infringement to import into the U.S. or to use, 
offer for sale, or sell within the U.S. any product made by a process 
patented in the U.S.43 Thus, Congress has acted to expand the ter-
ritorial scope of U.S. patent law when it has deemed it necessary to 
do so. 
c) Judicial Interpretation of Provisions Expanding the 
Territorial Scope 
Despite the expansion of the territorial scope under sections 
271(f) and (g), the strict presumption against extraterritorial appli-
                                                                                                                            
39 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529–32 (1972). 
40 See id. at 532. 
41 Patent Law Amendments Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-622, § 101, 98 Stat. 3383, 3383 
(1984); 4 MOY, supra note 3, § 14:24. 
42 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2012). 
43 3 MOY, supra note 3, § 12:8. Section 271(g) was enacted to correct the problem that 
products made abroad from processes or machines patented in the U.S. could be freely 
imported into the U.S., rendering the control granted under the U.S. patent without 
value. Id. 
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cation of U.S. patent law has remained intact even as it applies to 
those expanded sections.44 The Supreme Court interpreted the ex-
panded territorial scope of section 271(f) in Microsoft Corp. v. 
AT&T Corp., holding that a court must resolve any doubt of 
whether a foreign activity or transaction constitutes infringement 
by applying the presumption against extraterritoriality.45 Accor-
dingly, the presumption against extraterritoriality is not inoperative 
merely because a provision applies to foreign activity or transac-
tions—the presumption “remains instructive in determining the 
extent of the statutory exception.”46 Thus, even for a provision 
with expanded territorial reach, where clear congressional intent 
does not compel application of U.S. patent law to the foreign activi-
ty or transaction, Congress must act before such activity can be 
made subject to U.S. patent law.47 
d) Congress Has Not Expanded the Territorial Scope 
of the Patent Exhaustion Doctrine 
Given the Supreme Court’s firm pronouncements limiting the 
territorial scope of U.S. patent law, it is fair to assume that the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality applies equally to patent ex-
haustion. In other words, the territorial limitation of patent exhaus-
tion should be seen as a necessary corollary of the Supreme Court’s 
presumption against extraterritoriality. Although Congress has the 
power to expand the territorial scope of the patent exhaustion doc-
trine beyond the traditional U.S. territory defined in section 100(c), 
                                                                                                                            
44 See Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455–57 (2007). 
45 Id. at 454–57. 
46 Id. at 455–56. 
47 Id. at 458. The Supreme Court in Microsoft did not find the alleged infringing activity 
to fall within section 271(f): “The ‘loophole,’ in our judgment, is properly left for 
Congress to consider, and to close if it finds such action warranted.” Id. at 457. However, 
where a transaction occurs outside, but shares a nexus with U.S. jurisdictional territory, 
the transaction may fall within the territorial scope of U.S. patent law. In Transocean 
Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc., the Federal Circuit 
found sufficient congressional intent under section 271(a) that an offer for sale made 
outside U.S. jurisdictional territory constitutes infringement, where the delivery and sale 
of the patented invention would take place within U.S. territory. 617 F.3d 1296, 1309–10 
(Fed. Cir. 2010). While recognizing the presumption against extraterritorial application of 
U.S. patent law, the Federal Circuit found the foreign offer for sale infringing under 
section 271(a), because “the location of the contemplated sale controls whether there is 
an offer to sell within the United States.” Id. at 1309 (emphasis added). 
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it has not done so.48 As a result, foreign sales should be viewed as 
subject to the presumption against extraterritoriality and should 
therefore not be subject to U.S. patent law where all aspects of the 
sale occur outside U.S. territory. 
2. International Agreements Have Not Expanded the 
Territorial Scope 
A separate question is whether international agreements influ-
ence the territorial scope of U.S. patent law. The U.S. adheres to 
the three leading international agreements on patent law: the Paris 
Convention,49 the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”),50 and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (“TRIPS”).51 None of the agreements, however, have ef-
fected substantive changes expanding the territorial scope of U.S. 
patent law; to the contrary, the agreements have reinforced the 
U.S. patent grant’s limited territorial scope. 
a) The Paris Convention 
The Paris Convention, enacted in 1883, was the first interna-
tional agreement on patent law.52 The Convention is limited to 
procedural issues, leaving substantive matters of patent law to the 
national law of each member country.53 The enacting member 
countries had great differences in their underlying policy of each 
country’s national patent grant and therefore could not fully agree 
on one “true” justification for the grant of patents.54 As a result, 
                                                                                                                            
48 Section 100(c) defines “United States” to only include “the United States of 
America, its territories and possessions.” 35 U.S.C. § 100(c) (2012). 
49 Convention Revising the Paris Convention of March 20, 1883, as Revised, for the 
Protection of Industrial Property, July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1583 [hereinafter Paris 
Convention]. 
50 Patent Cooperation Treaty, with Regulations, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645 
(entered into force Jan. 24, 1978). 
51 Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299. 
52 MARGO A. BAGLEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL PATENT LAW AND POLICY 69 (2013). 
53 See id. at 70. 
54 EDITH TILTON PENROSE, THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM 
20 (1951). An attempt to include natural rights as the theoretical basis for patent law in 
the Paris Convention was unsuccessful. See BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 9–11. 
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the goal of international harmonized substantive patent legislation 
was abandoned early on, in light of the practical impossibilities of 
achieving agreement between countries having different theories 
underlying the patent grant, diverging legal structures, and incon-
sistent economic goals.55 
The Paris Convention nevertheless resulted in agreement on 
two foundational procedural concepts. First, under Article 2, na-
tional treatment ensures that foreign applicants are entitled to the 
same patent rights afforded to citizens of another member country 
under the other country’s national law.56 Second, under Article 4, 
applicants who have filed an application in one member country are 
entitled to claim priority to that earlier filing date when filing an 
application in another member country within twelve months.57 
Article 4 thereby permits the applicant to expand the geograph-
ic scope of patent protection for the invention. But Article 4 does 
not extend the exclusive rights available under the national law of 
the first filed patent application.58 The rights obtained under the 
national law of the country of the second filed application are go-
verned solely by the national law of the country granting the patent 
and are independent of all other patents for the same invention is-
sued under other countries’ national laws.59 The legal indepen-
dence of patents granted by different national laws was added ex-
pressly in 1900, during the first revision of the Paris Convention as 
Article 4bis: “Patents applied for in the various countries of the 
                                                                                                                            
55 Paris Convention, supra note 49, art. 2; PENROSE, supra note 54, at 53. 
56 BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 70–71. 
57 Paris Convention, supra note 49, art. 4. 
58 PENROSE, supra note 54, at 71. 
59 Id. at 72–73. While national treatment and the right of priority harmonize the ability 
to obtain patent protection in each member country, neither Article imposes substantive 
changes in national law. See id. at 70–71. Thus, even with national treatment, each 
member country remains free to provide as many or few substantive rights to patent 
holders as desired, commensurate with the underlying public policy and territorial scope 
of the national patent grant. See BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 69 and accompanying 
text. The Supreme Court in Boesch v. Graff therefore properly concluded, consistent with 
the territoriality doctrine and the Paris Convention, that action taken under a foreign 
patent does not affect the rights held under a U.S. patent: “A prior foreign patent 
operates under our law to limit the duration of the subsequent patent here, but that is 
all.” 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890). It should be noted that while the Court’s statement is 
wholly consistent with the articles of the Paris Convention, the Court did not expressly 
refer to the Paris Convention. 
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Union by nationals of countries of the Union shall be independent of 
patents obtained for the same invention in other countries, whether 
members of the Union or not.”60 Actions taken under a patent 
granted in another Paris Convention member country therefore do 
not have any substantive impact on the rights held under a parallel 
U.S. patent.61 
b) The Patent Cooperation Treaty 
Article 19 of the Paris Convention reserves to member coun-
tries the right to make additional “special agreements for the pro-
                                                                                                                            
60 Paris Convention, supra note 49, art. 4bis(1) (emphasis added). 
61 Any argument that the foreign sale under a foreign parallel patent right results in 
patent exhaustion under U.S. patent law is therefore nothing more than the broad 
assertion that parallel foreign patent rights should be viewed as coterminous as a matter of 
law—an outcome without legal basis until such harmonization is achieved by international 
agreement. But see John A. Rothschild, Exhausting Extraterritoriality, 51 SANTA CLARA L. 
REV. 1187, 1205–15 (2011) (arguing exhaustion results under a U.S. patent from the 
foreign sale under a parallel foreign patent, because the foreign sale results in a “patent-
based” reward under the foreign patent grant regardless of the rights and scope actually 
granted under each national patent grant). Alternatively, an argument could hold that 
parallel foreign patent rights may be sufficiently identical to justify that the authorization 
under one patent must exhaust the statutory right to exclude under the U.S. patent. The 
district court in Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., refused this argument as 
requiring an extensive inquiry into foreign law: 
For us to hold that the United States patent monopoly was destroyed 
because [the licensee] took free of the Italian patent monopoly, we 
believe we would have to determine under defendant’s theory that 
those monopolies were virtually identical or, at least, very similar. 
Even if we were to accept conceptually that unjust enrichment 
defense, accordingly, we would have to make some inquiry into 
exactly what the plaintiff had under the Italian patent. The Supreme 
Court in Boesch avoided an inquiry into the legal significance of 
differences between American and German patent laws by framing 
the question before it broadly, in terms of persons “authorized” 
under German law. We consider it unwise to involve ourselves in the 
niceties of Italian patent law, and the difficulties inherent in 
determining those facts and comparing the plaintiff’s foreign and 
American patent rights underscore the untenability of defendant’s 
theory. 
453 F. Supp. 1283, 1286–87 (E.D. Pa. 1978) (internal citations omitted). Thus, as 
demonstrated by the court in Griffin, by requiring that the rights and scope of the U.S. 
and the foreign patent are identical, the argument proves itself incapable of any real 
application as a legal rule, because the outcome under U.S. law would be dependent the 
rights and scope of a foreign patent, which vary considerably from one country to the 
next. 
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tection of industrial property.”62 The Patent Cooperation Treaty is 
such an agreement. The PCT creates an international patent filing 
system, but it does not grant an international patent and does not 
prescribe substantive requirements for patentability.63 The PCT is 
therefore also a procedural treaty, improving upon the framework 
created by the Paris Convention to enable a simple application pro-
cedure, allowing an applicant to easily file applications in several 
countries simultaneously by filing a PCT application.64 The PCT 
does not provide a “global patent” or otherwise provide any subs-
tantive harmonization of patent rights in its currently 148 member 
countries.65 
c) The TRIPS Agreement 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (“TRIPS”), signed in April 1994 and administered by 
the World Trade Organization, is the most recent of the three 
agreements.66 TRIPS is a substantive agreement requiring the na-
tional law of member countries to meet certain minimum stan-
dards. But the TRIPS agreement expressly excludes any effect on 
issues of patent exhaustion: 
Article 6 – Exhaustion 
For the purposes of dispute settlement under this 
Agreement, subject to the provisions of [TRIPS] 
Articles 3 and 4 nothing in this Agreement shall be 
                                                                                                                            
62 Paris Convention, supra note 49, art. 19. 
63 Patent Cooperation Treaty, supra note 50, art. 27(5) (“Nothing in this Treaty and 
the Regulations is intended to be construed as prescribing anything that would limit the 
freedom of each Contracting State to prescribe such substantive conditions of 
patentability as it desires.”); see also BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 106. 
64 BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 93–94. The PCT international stage permits the 
applicant to delay filing in each member country or regional office for up to thirty months 
from the priority date of the PCT application. Id. at 106. Additionally, each PCT 
application receives a non-binding search report and written opinion while in the 
international stage. Id. at 102–04. Applicants must still, however, at their own behest file 
national stage applications in each national or regional office in which patent protection is 
desired and “the decision to grant or refuse a patent remains solely within the jurisdiction 
of each office.” Id. at 106. 
65 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. The PCT has 148 member countries as of 
the time of drafting of this Article. See PCT – The International Patent System, WORLD 
INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int./pct/en/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2015). 
66 TRIPS Agreement, supra note 51. 
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used to address the issue of the exhaustion of intel-
lectual property rights.67 
While the creation of the TRIPS agreement was motivated by 
goal of “reduc[ing] distortions and impediments to international 
trade”68 from varying levels of protection and enforcement of intel-
lectual property rights and for the first time created international 
minimum standards for patent protection, TRIPS does not alter 
the principle that patents are only granted under national law in 
each country.69 As a result, although the TRIPS agreement con-
tains certain substantive minimum standards, the agreement ex-
pressly disclaims any impact on the application of patent exhaus-
tion under the national laws of member countries. 
d) No Substantive Harmonization of International 
Patent Law 
All three patent agreements function to allow foreign citizens to 
obtain patent protection under another country’s national law. But 
the treaties and conventions do not remove the territorial bounda-
ries between the patents granted under each national law.70 As 
such, while the international patent system has developed dramati-
cally since the enactment of the Paris Convention, differences pers-
ist in the extent or scope of the substantive rights granted.71 The 
international agreements all rest on the basic principle of indepen-
dence of parallel patents granted under each country’s national 
                                                                                                                            
67 Id. art. 6. 
68 Id. pmbl. 
69 See id. art. 3 (requiring national treatment of nationals of other member countries). 
Specifically, because the TRIPS member countries diverge significantly in application of 
public policy to patent law, the agreement permits exclusion of certain subject matter 
from patent eligibility and allows compulsory licenses in limited circumstances. See, e.g., 
BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 143. 
70 BAGLEY ET AL., supra note 52, at 45. While substantive international harmonization 
of patent law has been attempted, the diverging public policies underlying patent law, 
even among developed countries, have presented an insurmountable obstacle. See id. at 
44 (“Even today, there remains a lack of the necessary consensus to create a system in 
which the filing of a single application would result in a globally valid patent that could be 
asserted in a single forum regardless of where infringement occurred.”). 
71 See Daniel R. Cahoy, Patent Fences and Constitutional Fence Posts: Property Barriers to 
Pharmaceutical Importation, 15 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 623, 663 n.174 
(2005) (noting, as an example, the broader scope of business method patents under U.S. 
law when compared to the national law of each member country of the European Union). 
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law. The agreements therefore reinforce the limited territorial 
scope of the U.S. patent grant and in no way cause actions taken 
under a parallel foreign patent to affect the right to claim infringe-
ment held under a U.S. patent. 
II. NO PATENT EXHAUSTION FROM FOREIGN SALES 
ABSENT CONTRACTUAL AUTHORIZATION 
While the Supreme Court has provided clear guidance on the 
territorial scope of U.S. patent law, the Court has so far not ruled 
on facts presenting a foreign sale, where the seller held both U.S. 
patent rights and patent rights in the foreign jurisdiction in which 
the sale occurred. The absence of an express framework by the Su-
preme Court for applying patent exhaustion to foreign sales al-
lowed several federal district and circuit courts to apply patent ex-
haustion to all foreign sales as a default rule, despite being irrecon-
cilable with the foundational nature and territorial scope of the 
U.S. patent grant.72 
Two Federal Circuit decisions in 2001 and 2005 ended the pre-
vious application of patent exhaustion to foreign sales. The Federal 
Circuit first limited patent exhaustion territorially in Jazz Photo 
Corp. v. International Trade Commission by holding that the first sale 
of a patented good “must have occurred under the United States 
patent.”73 The court subsequently clarified in Fuji Photo Film Co. v. 
Jazz Photo Corp. that the limited territorial scope of the U.S. patent 
grant prevents a foreign sale by the U.S. patent holder from ex-
hausting the rights held under the U.S. patent.74 Perhaps because 
                                                                                                                            
72 See, e.g., Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 71 
(2d Cir. 1920); Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 F. 192 (8th Cir. 1897); Dickerson v. Matheson, 
57 F. 524 (2d Cir. 1893); Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac Tech. Dev. Corp., 690 
F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods. Inc., 565 F. 
Supp 931 (D.N.J. 1983); Holiday v. Matheson, 24 F. 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885). 
73 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 701–03 
(1890)). 
74 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo 
Corp., 249 F. Supp. 2d 434, 450 n.20 (D.N.J. 2003) (applying Jazz Photo Corp. as stare 
decisis). The Federal Circuit has since affirmed the territorial limitation of patent 
exhaustion twice. See Ninestar Tech. Co., Ltd. v. ITC, 667 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 
2012); Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun, 605 F.3d 1366, 1371–72 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (holding that 
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the question of patent exhaustion from a foreign sale was not the 
primary issue in dispute in either decision, the Federal Circuit did 
not provide an in-depth analysis to support its holdings.75 As a re-
sult, the Federal Circuit decisions cannot readily be applied to a full 
spectrum of fact patterns, including the effect of contractual autho-
rization of conduct with respect to the invention within U.S. terri-
tory. The simple framework that this Article proposes for resolving 
questions of patent exhaustion resulting from a foreign sale—that 
actions taken outside U.S. territory should have no effect on U.S. 
patent rights unless contractually authorized—is consistent with 
the Federal Circuit decisions and provides a straightforward me-
thod of analysis that those decisions lack. To provide a full frame-
work for the application of patent exhaustion to foreign sales, this 
Article next analyzes the doctrine’s theoretical underpinnings not 
fully articulated by the Federal Circuit. 
A. The Single Reward Principle 
1. Theoretical Underpinnings 
The public policy rationale for patent exhaustion, referred to in 
this Article as the single reward principle, was developed in a line 
of mid-nineteenth century Supreme Court decisions.76 The pre-
mise of the rationale, as stated above, is that patent holders are en-
titled only to a single reward as the incentive to invent, and they 
received that reward when they sell the patented good, thereby 
terminating the statutory exclusive right.77 The rationale for the 
single reward principle was first explained by the Supreme Court in 
the 1852 decision, Bloomer v. McQuewan, addressing whether a 
                                                                                                                            
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008) did not eliminate the 
territorial limitation of the patent exhaustion doctrine). 
75 See Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Jazz Photo Corp., 264 
F.3d 1094 (Fed Cir. 2001). 
76 See Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 348, 350 (1863); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 
U.S. 539, 547–48 (1852). 
77 United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251 (1948) (“Our decisions have 
uniformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law [to promote progress in the 
useful arts] is fulfilled with respect to any particular article when the patentee has 
received his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the article, and that once 
that purpose is realized the patent law affords no basis for restraining the use and 
enjoyment of the thing sold.”). 
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purchaser of a wood-planing machine during the original term of 
the patent also held the right to use the machine during the pa-
tent’s extension term.78 The Supreme Court held that the first sale 
of a patented good frees that article from the statutory right to ex-
clude, permitting unrestricted use by the purchaser: 
In using [the patented good], [the purchaser] exer-
cises no rights created by the act of Congress, nor 
does he derive title to it by virtue of the franchise or 
exclusive privilege granted to the patentee. The in-
ventor might lawfully sell it to him, whether he had 
a patent or not, if no other patentee stood in his 
way. And when the machine passes to the hands of 
the purchaser, it is no longer within the limits of the 
monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no longer 
under the protection of the act of Congress. And if 
his right to the implement or machine is infringed, 
he must seek redress in the courts of the State, ac-
cording to the laws of the State, and not in the 
courts of the United States, nor under the law of 
Congress granting the patent. The implement or 
machine becomes his private, individual property, 
not protected by the laws of the United States, but 
by the laws of the State in which it is situated.79 
Once a patented good is sold, the patent grant is therefore not 
available to restrict the purchaser’s rights to use, sell, and repair 
the article.80 Thus, the result of the patent exhaustion doctrine is 
that it operates to preclude the patent owner from placing post-sale 
restrictions on the sale of a patented good,81 which would otherwise 
                                                                                                                            
78 McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 540–41. The term of a patent could, under section 18 of the 
1836 Patent Act, be extended by the Commissioner of Patents for an additional seven 
years beyond the original term. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 18, 5 Stat. 117, 124 (repealed 
1861). 
79 McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549–50. 
80 Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 626–27 (2008); Univis, 316 
U.S. at 251–52; Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 
515–17 (1917); Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1913); Adams v. Burke, 84 
U.S. 453, 458 (1873); Millinger, 68 U.S. at 350; McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549–50. 
81 While the prohibition against post-sale restrictions results from the limited nature of 
the U.S. patent grant solely as a right to exclude, the corollary benefits of free use of the 
patented good by the purchaser should not be viewed as an independent underlying public 
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provide the patent owner a right the U.S. patent grant never con-
ferred—a right to restrict the purchaser’s common law rights in 
the good.82 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in McQuewan left unans-
wered how the single reward principle itself becomes satisfied, 
merely stating that once a patented good is sold “it is no longer 
within the limits of the monopoly.”83 The subsequent 1863 Su-
preme Court decision in Bloomer v. Millinger84 provided the answer. 
The Court in Millinger focused on the consideration received by 
the patent holder in exchange for the termination of the statutory 
right to exclude: 
Patentees acquire the exclusive right to . . . their pa-
tented inventions . . . but when they have made and 
                                                                                                                            
policy of the patent exhaustion doctrine. Accordingly, the territorial limitation of the 
patent exhaustion doctrine under U.S. law should not be viewed as having a protectionist 
purpose when applied to foreign sales. But see Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in 
Patented Goods: International Exhaustion for Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 325–32 
(2014) (finding that the patent exhaustion doctrine is independently justified by a 
reduction in transaction costs and the advancement of consumer rights, thereby 
supporting the introduction of patent exhaustion from all foreign sales under U.S. patent 
law). 
82 The patent exhaustion doctrine’s strict prohibition against post-sale restrictions 
likewise demonstrates why the case law applying exhaustion to foreign sales as a default 
rule, but allowing a patentee to contractually preclude exhaustion, is erroneous. Contra 
Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 71, 77–78 (2d 
Cir. 1920); Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 F. 192, 195 (8th Cir. 1897); Dickerson v. Matheson, 
57 F. 524, 527–28 (2d Cir. 1893); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 565 F. 
Supp 931, 938 (D.N.J. 1983); Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185, 185–86 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 
1885). Additionally, this aspect of patent exhaustion has been misunderstood as an 
implied license under the patent grant instead of the transfer of the common-law rights to 
the good sold, See Alfred C. Server & William J. Casey, Contract-Based Post-Sale 
Restrictions on Patented Products Following Quanta, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 561, 568 (2013) 
(“[T]he authorized first sale of a product is accompanied by an implied license to use and 
dispose of the product free from downstream control by the patent holder.”); John W. 
Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on Patentable 
Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 643, 689 (2004) 
(“[B]uying an article includes the implied right to use and resell the article.”). However, 
where there is no right under the patent to exclude, there is nothing from which to 
license. Accordingly, understanding the patent grant solely as a right to exclude dispels 
the argument that the public policy underlying the patent exhaustion doctrine “is that 
purchasers of patented goods who lack knowledge of any restrictions should be free to use 
the goods in an unlimited manner.” Osborne, supra, at 658. 
83 McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549. 
84 68 U.S. 340 (1863). 
1. 522 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.[Vol. XXV:499 
 
vended . . . one or more of the things patented, to 
that extent they have parted with their exclusive 
right. They are entitled to but one royalty for a patented 
machine, and consequently when a patentee has 
himself constructed the machine and sold it, or au-
thorized another to construct and sell it, or to con-
struct and use and operate it, and the consideration 
has been paid to him for the right, he has then to that 
extent parted with his monopoly . . . .85  
Thus, the single reward principle as a public policy justification 
operates through the termination of the statutory right to exclude 
in exchange for some form of consideration—not merely from 
compensation for the sale and transfer of title of personal proper-
ty.86 This conclusion follows from the nature of the patent grant 
solely as a right to exclude.87 The patent holder’s ability to sell the 
patented good is not a right granted by the patent.88 Accordingly, 
the sale of a good embodying a U.S. patent does not result in patent 
exhaustion if that sale does not operate to terminate the statutory 
right to exclude. 
The Supreme Court further explained the rationale that ex-
haustion occurs where a patent holder receives some form of con-
sideration in exchange for terminating the right to exclude in the 
1873 decision Adams v. Burke.89 In Adams, the Court applied the 
patent exhaustion doctrine to determine the right of a purchaser to 
                                                                                                                            
85 Id. at 350 (emphasis added). 
86 The Supreme Court’s reasoning underlying the single reward principle accordingly 
demonstrates why the patent exhaustion does not result merely from a patentee’s foreign 
sale of a good covered by a U.S. patent. Merely controlling the first sale is not sufficient to 
satisfy the patent exhaustion doctrine’s public policy justification where no reward is 
received in exchange for the termination of the statutory right to exclude under U.S. 
patent law. But see Margreth Barrett, The United States Doctrine of Exhaustion: Parallel 
Imports of Patented Goods, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 911, 948–49, 962–63 (2000) (arguing a 
patentee’s foreign sale results in the satisfaction of U.S. patent law’s utilitarian incentive, 
because the patentee received a financial benefit from the foreign sale, regardless of 
whether the sale terminates the statutory right to exclude under U.S. patent law). 
87 See supra Part I.A. 
88 See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 239 (1897) (“The patentee, so 
far as a personal use is concerned, received nothing which he did not have without the 
patent.”); McQuewan, 55 U.S. at 549; GLADNEY, supra note 25, at 9–10. 
89 84 U.S. 453 (1873). 
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use a patented good outside the ten-mile radius of the center of 
Boston, in which the licensee selling the good was permitted to 
sell.90 The Supreme Court again focused on the termination of the 
statutory right to exclude in exchange for consideration, holding 
that “in the essential nature of things, when the patentee, or the 
person having his rights, sells a machine or instrument whose sole 
value is in its use, he receives the consideration for its use and he 
parts with the right to restrict that use.”91 As a result, “the paten-
tee . . . having in the act of the sale received all the royalty or con-
sideration . . . for the use of his invention in that particular machine 
or instrument, [the patented good] is open to the use of the pur-
chaser without further restriction on account of the monopoly.”92 
The same public policy rationale has been repeated in more mod-
ern decisions. For example, in its 1942 decision U.S. v. Univis Lens 
Co.,93 the Supreme Court held that the earlier decisions “have un-
iformly recognized that the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled 
with respect to any particular article when the patentee has re-
ceived his reward for the use of his invention by the sale of the ar-
ticle, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law affords 
no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold.”94 
2. Proposed Framework Applies Single Reward Principle 
In accordance with the single reward principle, this Article’s 
proposed framework adopts the view that the patent exhaustion 
doctrine, as developed by the Supreme Court, only applies when a 
patent holder authorizes the first sale of a patented good and rece-
ives consideration in exchange for the termination of the statutory 
right to exclude others from using, selling, and repairing the article 
sold.95 Likewise, the Federal Circuit adopted the same policy justi-
fication for patent exhaustion in Jazz Photo Corp. v. International 
                                                                                                                            
90 See id. 
91 Id. at 456. 
92 Id. (emphasis added). 
93 316 U.S. 241 (1942). 
94 Id. at 251 (citing Adams, 84 U.S. at 456; Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 
U.S. 659 (1895); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 
(1917)); U.S. v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942). The validity of these decisions 
have not been affected by the 1952 and AIA amendments to the Patent Act. 
95 E.g., Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278. 
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Trade Commission,96 citing to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Masonite97 for the underlying policy justification 
that patent exhaustion occurs when “there has been such a disposi-
tion of the [patented good] that it may fairly be said that the paten-
tee has received his reward for the use of the [good].”98 
When the proposed framework is applied to a domestic sale of a 
patented good, the sale necessarily satisfies the single reward prin-
ciple because the sale makes the use, sale, and repair by the pur-
chaser of the patented good lawful under U.S. patent law—actions 
by the purchaser that were not lawful prior to the sale without the 
patent owner’s authorization. For sales within U.S. territory, the 
proposed framework therefore operates as a strict bright-line or per 
se rule—a domestic sale transferring all right and title in the pa-
tented good also terminates the patent holder’s statutory right to 
exclude and precludes the patent owner from asserting patent 
rights against the purchaser in the article sold.99 The Supreme 
Court has similarly applied patent exhaustion as a bright-line rule 
to domestic sales.100 Ironically, perhaps the application of patent 
exhaustion as a bright-line rule to domestic sales contributed to the 
                                                                                                                            
96 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
97 316 U.S. 265 (1942). 
98 Jazz Photo Corp., 264 F.3d at 1105 (quoting Masonite, 316 U.S. at 278). 
99 The purchaser, however, would still be excluded from making the patented 
invention without the authorization of the patentee. 
100 See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 625, 638 (2008); Server 
& Casey, supra note 82, at 579–82. Prior to Quanta, the Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit had permitted some post-sale restrictions to be placed on the outright sale of 
patented goods, where the court judicially treated the sale as less than a full sale, in effect 
reviving the conditional sale doctrine struck down by the Supreme Court in Bauer & Cie v. 
O’Donnell, 229 U.S. 1 (1913). See B. Braun Med., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 124 F.3d 1419, 
1426–28 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 703–09 
(Fed. Cir. 1992). The conditional sale doctrine originated in Heaton-Peninsular Button-
Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. by the Sixth Circuit in an 1896 opinion by then Judge 
Lurton. 77 F. 288, 295–97, 301 (6th Cir. 1896). After appointment by President Taft to 
the Supreme Court in 1909, Justice Lurton authored the opinion in Henry v. A.B. Dick Co. 
in 1912 adopting his own rationale in Heaton-Peninsular and the conditional sale doctrine. 
See Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1, 18–26 (1912). However, the doctrine was struck 
down only one year later by the Court in Bauer & Cie v. O’Donnell. 229 U.S. at 14–17. The 
Supreme Court in Quanta did not expressly overrule the Federal Circuit’s revived 
application of the conditional sale doctrine, but Quanta may be viewed as doing so 
implicitly. See, e.g., Server & Casey, supra note 82, at 592–94; Rajec, supra note 81, at 344 
n.115. 
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development of case law applying patent exhaustion as a default 
rule to all foreign sales.101 
B. Subjecting the Single Reward Principle to the Limited 
Territorial Scope of the U.S. Patent Grant 
1. Mechanics 
In Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., the Federal Circuit 
adhered to the limited territorial scope of the U.S. patent grant to 
limit the patent exhaustion doctrine to domestic sales.102 The pro-
posed framework likewise adheres to the territorial limitation of the 
U.S. patent grant to explain why the single reward doctrine cannot 
be satisfied in a foreign sale, unless the sale contractually authoriz-
es conduct with respect to the invention within U.S. territory. The 
underlying reasoning of the proposed framework is that because 
U.S. patent law has no effect outside U.S. territory,103 the buyer in 
a foreign jurisdiction can already make, use, sell, and offer for sale 
the invention claimed in the U.S. patent without the need for any 
permission from the U.S. patent holder.104 Accordingly, a foreign 
sale cannot satisfy the single reward principle, because the sale 
does not provide any consideration that operates to terminate the 
statutory right to exclude under U.S. patent law. 
2. Boesch v. Graff 
The foundational principles of the nature and territorial scope 
of the U.S. patent grant were also addressed by the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                            
101 See Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d 
Cir. 1920); Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 F. 192 (8th Cir. 1897); Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 
524 (2d Cir. 1893); Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac Technology Development 
Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 
565 F. Supp 931 (D.N.J. 1983); Holiday v. Matheson, 24 F. 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885). 
102 See Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“The patentee’s authorization of an international first sale does not affect exhaustion of 
that patentee’s rights in the United States.”). 
103 See supra Part I.B; Fuji Photo Film Co., 394 F.3d at 1376 (“ . . . [T]he United States 
patent system does not provide for extraterritorial effect.” (citing Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. 
Samsung Elecs. Co., 361 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2004))). 
104 This reasoning necessarily does not apply where the U.S. patentee, or another 
person or entity, holds a patent for the same invention under the laws of the foreign 
jurisdiction. 
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in the 1890 decision Boesch v. Graff,105 relied on by the Federal Cir-
cuit in Jazz Photo Corp.106 But Boesch did not present a fact pattern 
where the seller in a foreign sale held patent rights both in the U.S. 
and in the jurisdiction in which the sale occurred.107 In Boesch, a 
U.S. buyer had purchased lamp burners from a German seller.108 
The lamp burners were patented in both Germany and the U.S.; 
however, the German seller was not the owner of the German pa-
tent but only held the right to sell the lamp burners under prior us-
er rights afforded by imperial German law.109 The Supreme Court 
nevertheless framed the question before the Court broadly: 
[W]hether a dealer residing in the United States can 
purchase in another country articles patented there, 
from a person authorized to sell them, and import 
them to and sell them in the United States, without 
the license or consent of the owners of the United 
States patent.110  
The Supreme Court distinguished domestic sales of patented 
goods by limiting patent exhaustion to sales authorized under a 
U.S. patent.111 The Court’s reasoning appears rooted in the limited 
territorial scope of U.S. patent law, holding that “[a] prior foreign 
                                                                                                                            
105 133 U.S. 697 (1890). 
106 Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
107 The Supreme Court, however, has denied certiorari three times on the recent 
Federal Circuit precedent applying territorial limitation of patent exhaustion as a matter 
of law. Ninestar Tech. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 1656 (2013), denying cert. 
to 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Benun v. Fujifilm Corp., 131 S. Ct. 829 (2010), denying 
cert. to 605 F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 
536 U.S. 950 (2002), denying cert. to 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Several lower 
courts have also interpreted Boesch narrowly, holding it only to apply where the seller in 
the foreign sale did not own the parallel U.S. patent. See, e.g., Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor 
Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng’g Corp., 266 F. 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1920); Dickerson v. Tinling, 
84 F. 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1897); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., 565 F. Supp 
931, 937–38 (D.N.J. 1983). Other lower courts interpreted Boesch consistently with the 
territorial scope of each parallel patent grant as existing solely under the national law 
granting the respective patent right, thus requiring independent authorization by the 
patent owner of each patent right. See, e.g., Daimler Mfg. Co. v. Conklin, 170 F. 70, 72 (2d 
Cir. 1909); Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283, 1285–87 (E.D. 
Pa. 1978). 
108 Boesch, 133 U.S. at 698–99. 
109 Id. at 701–02. 
110 Id. at 702. 
111 Id. at 703. 
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patent operates under [U.S.] law to limit the duration of the subse-
quent patent here, but that is all,” because “[t]he sale of articles in 
the United States under a United States patent cannot be con-
trolled by foreign laws.”112 The Court based its conclusion on the 
fundamental nature of the patent grant, “consist[ing] altogether in 
the right to exclude every one from making, using or vending the 
thing patented without the permission of the patentee.”113 
Thus, the Boesch decision requires a foreign sale to meet the 
same public policy goal as a domestic sale for patent exhaustion to 
occur under U.S. patent law: the U.S. patentee must receive some 
form of consideration in exchange for termination of the statutory 
right to exclude with regard to the good sold.114 Accordingly, the 
territorial limitation of patent exhaustion adopted by the proposed 
framework finds support in both the limited territorial scope of the 
U.S. patent grant and the Supreme Court’s decision in Boesch. 
Sharing the same foundation, they are therefore best understood as 
variations of the same justification. 
C. Contractual Authorization Results in Patent Exhaustion 
To present a complete framework for patent exhaustion from 
foreign sales, a final question not yet addressed by the Federal Cir-
cuit must be answered: how strict is the territorial limitation of pa-
tent exhaustion? Two main alternatives appear available. First, a 
rigid bright-line rule would hold that all sales must physically occur 
within U.S. territory.115 Second, a more flexible rule would instead 
consider the contract between the parties to establish whether the 
sale, although occurring abroad, authorized the purchaser to use or 
sell the patented good within U.S. territory.116 The second alterna-
                                                                                                                            
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 702 (quoting Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 549 (1852)) (emphasis 
added). 
114 Id. 
115 See Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 136–42 (D.D.C. 2006) (“[T]o 
establish exhaustion . . . [the party claiming the affirmative defense] must establish that 
[the patented goods] were sold in the United States—that is, delivered into the United 
States ‘under’ a United States patent.”). 
116 See Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370–71 (Fed. Cir. 2011); 
Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-CV-2618-H (KSC), 2012 WL 6863471, at 
*5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2012); STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Sandisk Corp., No. 4:05CV45, 
2007 WL 951655, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2007) (“The Jazz Photo case does not stand 
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tive is more consistent with the delineation in section 271 that in-
fringement only occurs when someone acts with respect to the in-
vention without the authority of the patentee.117 This Article there-
fore suggests that U.S. courts should adopt the second alternative. 
1. A Flawed Bright-Line Rule 
Under the first alternative, delivery of the patented good sold 
must occur within U.S. territory to trigger patent exhaustion. This 
interpretation finds support in the Federal Circuit’s statement in 
Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp. that “foreign sales can never 
occur under a United States patent because the United States pa-
tent system does not provide for extraterritorial effect.”118 The dis-
trict court in Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst interpreted this statement 
to mean that patent exhaustion only applies where delivery of the 
patented good occurs in the U.S.119 Nevertheless, the interpreta-
tion is not entirely consistent with section 271, which states that 
infringement does not occur when the purchaser acts under the 
authority of the patentee.120 
An illustration is helpful. Consider the fact pattern where a li-
censee located outside the U.S. holds a worldwide license to manu-
facture and sell the patented invention. The licensee sells the pa-
tented good to a foreign purchaser delivery F.O.B. abroad,121 with 
full knowledge that the foreign purchaser intends to import the pa-
                                                                                                                            
for the proposition that only sales within the United States can trigger the doctrine when 
there is a valid license covering the products. STM gave Toshiba a license in all types of 
patents with respect to the licensed products in all countries of the world. All the countries 
of the world includes the United States of America. Therefore, Toshiba (or its 
subsidiaries) had the right to sale any of the licensed products under the United States 
Patents . . . in the United States or anywhere in the world.”).  
117 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever 
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the 
United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of 
the patent therefor, infringes the patent.”). 
118 Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
119 Minebea Co., 444 F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
120 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012) (“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to 
sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent.”) (emphasis added). 
121 Delivery F.O.B (“Free on Board”) is an Incoterm indicating the seller is only 
responsible for getting the good onto a carrier or to a location designated by the buyer at 
which point the risk of loss transfers to the buyer. Free on Board, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/free_on_board_fob (last visited Jan. 20, 2014). 
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tented good into the U.S. Applying the bright-line rule, patent ex-
haustion would not apply, because delivery did not occur within 
U.S. territory, despite authorization by the licensee to import into 
and sell within the U.S.122 The bright-line rule would therefore 
permit a U.S. patent holder or exclusive licensee to sue for in-
fringement where a patented good is otherwise authorized to be 
imported into, used, and/or sold within the U.S., merely because 
the patented good was delivered F.O.B. abroad. As a result, the pa-
tentee could receive two rewards for the sale of the same patented 
good in contravention of the single reward principle and, in conflict 
with section 271, could successfully bring an action for infringe-
ment even though the purchaser acted under the authority of the 
patentee. 
2. Contractual Authorization Must Result in Patent 
Exhaustion 
To maintain consistency with section 271, the better rule is that 
patent exhaustion occurs where the U.S. patentee, or its licensee, 
in a foreign sale authorizes importation into, use, or sale of the pa-
tented good in the U.S. This interpretation is also consistent with 
the single reward principle, because a foreign sale authorizing con-
duct with regard to the invention within the U.S. represents con-
sideration for termination of the statutory right to exclude. The 
interpretation is further consistent with patent exhaustion as an 
affirmative defense to a claim of patent infringement,123 because 
the contractual authorization makes actions lawful that would be 
unlawful without the authorization. As a result, there would be no 
right to claim infringement under section 271.124 This interpreta-
tion does not alter the territorial limitation of patent exhaustion: 
where the U.S. patentee sells the patented good in a foreign sale 
                                                                                                                            
122 The same outcome, of course, would result if the U.S. patentee makes the foreign 
sale, delivery F.O.B. abroad, knowing that the foreign purchaser intends to import into 
and sell the patented goods in the U.S. 
123 E.g., ExcelStor Tech., Inc. v. Papst Licensing GMBH & Co., 541 F.3d 1373, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[P]atent exhaustion is a defense to patent infringement, not a cause of 
action.”). 
124 See STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Sandisk Corp., No. 4:05CV45, 2007 WL 951655, at 
*3 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2007) (holding foreign sale under worldwide license to sell 
patented good constituted affirmative defense to claim for infringement and resulted in 
patent exhaustion). 
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without authorizing importation into, use, or sale in the U.S., the 
foreign purchaser has not paid consideration in exchange for the 
termination of the statutory right to exclude with regard to the pa-
tented good. The U.S. patent holder would therefore still have a 
right to claim infringement for any unauthorized importation into, 
or use or sale of the patented good sold in the foreign sale. 
The Federal Circuit appears to have adopted a form of this 
second interpretation in Tessera v. International Trade Commission, 
decided in 2011.125 In Tessera, the Federal Circuit held that pa-
tented goods sold abroad by a licensee holding an unconditional 
license under the U.S. patent “to sell . . . and/or offer for sale” ex-
hausted the patent holder’s U.S. patent rights.126 Accordingly, a 
foreign buyer importing the patented goods into the U.S. did not 
infringe the patent.127 The factual record in Tessera regarding the 
exact language and nature of the license grant, however, is heavily 
redacted.128 Nevertheless, Tessera was decided by the Federal Cir-
cuit five years after the bright-line rule endorsed by the district 
court in Minebea. Tessera may therefore be viewed as implicitly 
overruling Minebea’s bright-line rule.129 
Relying on Tessera, the District Court of the Southern District 
of California in Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc.130 likewise held 
that a sale occurring in Japan exhausted the U.S. patent rights be-
cause the licensee making the sale held a worldwide license to the 
U.S. patent.131 As a result, the court viewed that any sale made sub-
ject to the agreement represented full consideration for termination 
of the statutory right to exclude under U.S. patent law.132 The Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Texas similarly held in STMi-
                                                                                                                            
125 See Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1370–71. 
128 See Certain Semiconductor Chips with Minimized Chip Package Size and Products 
Containing Same (III), Initial Determination on Violation of Section 337 and 
Recommended Determination on Remedy and Bond, Inv. No. 337-TA-630, 2009 WL 
3092628, at *88–92 (Int’l Trade Comm’n Aug. 28, 2009). 
129 Compare Tessera, 646 F.3d at 1370–71, with Minebea Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 
2d 68, 136–42 (D.D.C. 2006). 
130 Multimedia Patent Trust v. Apple Inc., No. 10-CV-2618-H, 2012 WL 6863471 (S.D. 
Cal. Nov. 9, 2012). 
131 Id. at *4–5. 
132 Id. at *5 n.7. 
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croelectronics, Inc. v. Sandisk Corp., decided prior to Tessera, that a 
worldwide license to sell a patented good resulted in patent exhaus-
tion, even where the sale occurred outside the U.S.133 The court in 
STMicroelectronics directly addressed the question whether exhaus-
tion occurs under U.S. patent law when a foreign sale is made sub-
ject to a worldwide license and distinguished the strict rule against 
exhaustion from foreign sales under Jazz Photo where the foreign 
sale contractually authorized resale within the U.S.134 Accordingly, 
Tessera, Multimedia Patent Trust, and STMicroelectronics are all con-
sistent with the single reward principle and preclude a patentee 
from placing post-sale restrictions on the patented good, regardless 
of the country of sale, once the patentee has received a reward in 
exchange for termination of the statutory right to exclude under 
U.S. patent law.135 
III.  A FRAMEWORK PROVIDING CERTAINTY TO U.S. 
PATENT HOLDERS 
The analysis of the single reward principle within the bounda-
ries of the basic nature and territorial scope of the U.S. patent grant 
results in a simple and concise framework for the application of pa-
tent exhaustion to foreign sales. Absent contractual authorization 
of conduct within U.S. territory, the public policy rationale—the 
single reward principle—underlying patent exhaustion cannot be 
satisfied in a foreign sale. Applying the framework to common fact 
patterns involving foreign sales demonstrates that the territorial 
limitation provides certainty to U.S. patent holders, their licensees, 
and foreign buyers. 
                                                                                                                            
133 STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Sandisk Corp., No. 4:05CV45, 2007 WL 951655, at *3 
(E.D. Tex. Mar. 26, 2007). STMicroelectronics had granted “Toshiba and its 
subsidiaries a non-exclusive, non-transferable, royalty free, world wide license, without 
right to sub-license third parties, under ST PATENTS to make, HAVE MADE, use, 
lease, sell, offer for sale, import, or otherwise dispose of Licensed Products, and to use any 
methods covered by ST PATENTS, for the lives of ST PATENTS.” Id. at *1. 
134 Id. at *3. 
135 Tessera refers to “single recovery” instead of “single reward” to support its holding. 
Tessera, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 646 F.3d 1357, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 2011). The two 
district court cases instead rely primarily on the authorization rationale under Section 271. 
See Multimedia Patent Trust, 2012 WL 6863471, at *3, *5; STMicroelectronics, 2007 WL 
951655, at *3. 
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A. A Foreign Sale by U.S. Patent Holder Without Contractual 
Authorization 
Consider a U.S. patentee selling the patented good through a 
wholly-owned subsidiary in a foreign country or where the U.S. 
patentee is a foreign entity selling the patented good directly in its 
home market. Applying this Article’s framework, a foreign sale 
would not result in patent exhaustion under U.S. law, because the 
single reward principle had not been met. The consideration re-
ceived by the U.S. patentee seller could not be in exchange for ter-
mination of the statutory right to exclude under U.S. patent law, 
because U.S. patent law is territorially limited to the U.S. This out-
come would also result whether the U.S. patentee owned a parallel 
foreign patent right in the country of sale or not. In either case, the 
foreign sale would not make any conduct lawful with regard to the 
U.S. patented invention because the sale occurred outside U.S. ter-
ritory without contractual authorization of conduct with regard to 
the invention within the U.S. Of course, if a parallel patent right 
were owned in the country of sale, exhaustion could occur under 
the national patent law of that country. 
B. Foreign Sale by Licensee without Contractual Authorization 
As above, exhaustion would not occur where a licensee under 
the U.S. patent sold the patented good in a foreign sale. Because of 
the territorial limitation of U.S. patent law, the consideration was 
not received in exchange for termination of the statutory right to 
exclude under U.S. law; thus, the single reward principle is not 
met. This outcome results whether or not a licensee under the U.S. 
patent is also a licensee under a parallel foreign patent right in the 
country of sale, because “[t]he sale of articles in the United States 
under a United States patent cannot be controlled by foreign 
laws.”136 Similarly, the foreign sale by a party only holding a license 
under a parallel foreign patent right could not result in exhaustion 
under U.S. patent law. 
                                                                                                                            
136 Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890). 
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C. Foreign Sale Contractually Authorizing Conduct within U.S. 
Territory 
In contrast to the two previous fact patterns, patent exhaustion 
would occur whenever the U.S. patentee, or a licensee under the 
U.S. patent, in an otherwise foreign sale contractually authorized 
importation into, use, and/or sale within U.S. territory. For exam-
ple, where a U.S. patentee sold the patented good in Denmark but 
contractually authorized the Danish buyer to import into, use, or 
resell the good in the U.S., the U.S. patentee received considera-
tion in exchange for termination of the statutory right to exclude, 
thus satisfying the single reward principle. It is therefore irrelevant 
whether the U.S. patentee owned a parallel foreign patent right in 
the country of sale or not, or whether the licensee under the U.S. 
patent was also a licensee under a parallel foreign patent right. The 
sale will result in exhaustion under U.S. patent law, because the 
foreign purchaser’s conduct within U.S. territory was authorized 
and no longer subject to section 271. 
D. Certainty to U.S. Patent Holders 
As the fact-patterns show, the proposed framework provides 
certainty to U.S. patent holders, their licensees, and to foreign pur-
chasers by providing clear and simple rules. The framework is con-
sistent with the basic nature and territorial scope of the U.S. patent 
grant, because it is a simple application of the patent grant solely as 
a statutory right to exclude within U.S. territory. The framework 
thus fits squarely within current Supreme Court precedent. 
Additionally, the framework leaves the exhaustion doctrine free 
of fact-dependent inquiries regarding parallel foreign patent 
rights.137 When making a foreign sale, the U.S. patent holder or li-
censee is not required to evaluate any impact on the rights held un-
der U.S. patent law based on the ownership of a parallel patent 
                                                                                                                            
137 A court, however, may need to engage in a fact-dependent analysis to determine the 
scope of the express or implied contractual authorization of conduct with regard to the 
invention within U.S. territory. See, e.g., Carborundum Co. v. Molten Metal Equip. 
Innovations, Inc., 72 F.3d 872, 878–80 (Fed. Cir. 1995). But whereas an inquiry into the 
similarity of parallel patent rights requires a sophisticated understanding of foreign 
national patent law and international patent law agreements, an inquiry into the nature 
and scope of contractual authorization is well within the competence of any U.S. federal 
district court. 
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right in the country of sale—or the lack thereof. Instead, the U.S. 
patent holder, or licensee, in a foreign sale must solely focus on the 
existence of a contractual relationship with the foreign purchaser as 
to any rights within U.S. territory with regard to the patented good. 
If the U.S. patent holder in a foreign sale does not authorize any 
rights within the U.S. for the patented good, patent exhaustion 
does not apply to the sale under U.S. law. 
In contrast, where contractual authorization for conduct within 
U.S. territory arises—whether express or implied138—patent ex-
haustion applies to the sale, even if the sale occurs entirely outside 
U.S. territory. The U.S. patent holder therefore cannot receive 
more than one reward in exchange for termination of the statutory 
right to exclude under U.S. patent law. The U.S. patent holder 
must be viewed as having received the reward bargained for in ex-
change for authorized use within U.S. territory, thus satisfying the 
single reward principle. The proposed framework therefore pro-
duces consistent and predictable outcomes from foreign sales, re-
gardless of ownership, licensing obligations, and ownership of pa-
rallel foreign patent rights. 
CONCLUSION 
The framework this Article proposes for determining when pa-
tent exhaustion applies to foreign sales reaches beyond current 
judicial application of the patent exhaustion doctrine. It imposes a 
territorial limitation on patent exhaustion that both ensures consis-
tency with the basic nature and territorial scope of the U.S. patent 
grant and maintains symmetry between the exercise of the statuto-
ry right to exclude and the availability of patent exhaustion as an 
affirmative defense to patent infringement. Where a foreign sale 
does not contractually authorize conduct with regard to the inven-
tion within U.S. territory, the statutory right to exclude cannot be 
                                                                                                                            
138 Contractual authorization under a U.S. patent may be implied where the parties’ 
agreement can be plainly inferred from the express language of the agreement, oral 
agreements, or conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances. See Radar Indus., Inc. 
v. Cleveland Die & Mfg. Co., 424 Fed. App’x 931, 933–34 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting De 
Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236, 241 (1927)); Anton/Bauer, 
Inc. v. PAG, Ltd., 329 F.3d 1343, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. Korners 
Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
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exercised and thus no corresponding affirmative defense will arise. 
But the proposed framework should not be considered a novel ex-
position of the law. The Supreme Court has defined the patent 
grant as a right to exclude others and applied the presumption 
against extraterritoriality with equal force for more than 150 
years.139 To now hold otherwise would confuse most basic prin-
ciples of U.S. patent law. 
                                                                                                                            
139 See supra Part I.B. 
